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Abstract
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nance their mutual positions over time and circumstances. This interactive process involves
money creation at the aggregate level. Coordination mismatch on interbank credit may trig-
ger systemic crises. This happened when, since summer 2007, interbank credit coordination
did not longer work smoothly across financial institutions, eventually requiring exceptional
monetary policies by central banks, and guarantee and bailout interventions by govern-
ments. Our article develops an interacting heterogeneous agents-based model of interbank
credit coordination under minimal institutions. First, we explore the link between interbank
credit coordination and the money generation process. Contrary to received understand-
ing, interbank credit has the capacity to make the monetary system unbound. Second, we
develop simulation analysis on imperfect interbank credit coordination, studying impact of
interbank dynamics on financial stability and resilience at individual and aggregate levels.
Systemically destabilizing forces prove to be related to the working of the banking system
over time, especially interbank coordination conditions and circumstances.
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1 Introduction
During recent decades before the global financial crisis, mainstream economic theory had quite
neglected the role of money and credit in economy and society (Jakab and Kumhof, 2015;
Werner, 2014a,b). In particular, macroeconomic theory was drawing upon the real business
cycle approach, developing Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models where
money and credit do not play a significant role (Blanchard, 2009; Stiglitz and Gallegati, 2011;
Romer, 2016; Delli Gatti et al., 2010; Blanchard et al., 2010). In this context, banking may
be understood as a mechanic process that merely dispatches central bank base money to non-
financial, real-economic agents who need borrowing. Moreover, banking theory was developing
principal-agent approaches that introduce contractual arrangements and incentives in the bank
entity structure while relegating bank money generation function outside banking theoretical
core (Calorimis and Kahn, 1991; Diamond and Rajan, 2001; Gorton and Pennacchi, 1990). At
the same time, financial economics was developing a market-based finance theory where banks
are considered as portfolio managers quite analoguous to other investment funds and submitted
to financial markets discipline (Tobin, 1963; Black, 1970; Fama, 1980; Hall, 1983). From these
perspectives, banking come to be understood as pure intermediation of available funds between
savers who wish to invest those funds, and borrowers who need borrowing them.
Evidence from the global financial crisis of 2007-08 has been renewing theoretical interest in
the role of banking, money and credit in economic and financial dynamics. While the crisis
was accidentally triggered by rising actual and expected defaults in some bank asset categories,
the origins of the global financial meltdown were found in systemic fragilities related to bank
excess behaviours and the overarching dynamics of interbank credit, leading to central bank in-
terventions and government bailouts to protect financial stability and assure financial resilience
(Bank of England, 2008). Interbank lending and borrowing occur when financial institutions
seek to settle and refinance their mutual positions over time and circumstances. This interactive
process involves money generation at the aggregate level. Coordination mismatch on interbank
credit may trigger systemic crises. This happened when, since summer 2007, interbank credit
coordination did not longer work smoothly across financial institutions around the world, even-
tually requiring exceptional monetary policies through central bank coordination.
Recent studies have been investigating the role of money, credit and interbank credit networks
in the working of the financial system, including when financial crises occur. Martnez-Jaramillo
et al. (2010) and Caccioli et al. (2015) develop simulation models that relate interbank dy-
namics with systemic risk. Matsuoka (2012) provides a monetary model for understanding the
role of a lender of last resort (i.e.: central banks) in an economy with an imperfect interbank
market. Anand et al. (2012) address the heavy reliance on short-term wholesale funding mar-
kets in a vastly and increasingly connected financial system during the global financial crisis of
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2007/2008, leading to a dramatic increase in rollover risk at the system level. Further studies
focus on the interbank credit network structure and the financial linkages between banks, of-
ten applying agent-based simulations (Krause and Giansante, 2012; Teteryatnikova, 2014; Bech
et al., 2015; Capponi and Chen, 2015).
Many studies apply agent-based modelling (ABM) to analyze the interbank credit dynam-
ics. Huang et al. (2010) apply an ABM to examine various types of financial crises. Galbiati
and Soramaoki (2011) propose an ABM of interbank payment systems under real-time gross
settlement modality that seems to be vulnerable to liquidity risk. To their knowledge, it is the
first paper that explores liquidity management in such a system using an agent-based approach.
Other ABM are applied to explain: the formation, evolution and stability of interbank market
(Iori et al., 2006; Xu et al., 2016; Ladley, 2013), the emergence of network structure (e.g.: core-
periphery) (Lux, 2015), the linkage between the interbank market and the real economy (Gabbi
et al., 2015), the repercussions of inter-bank connectivity on banks’ performances, bankruptcy
waves and business cycle fluctuations (Grilli et al., 2015), the role of trading memory or trust in
the interbank relationships (Iori et al., 2015; Temizsoy et al., 2015; Bulbul, 2013), the behavior
of bank leverage (Fischer and Riedler, 2014; Aymanns and Farmer, 2015), the role of stabilizing
institutional arrangements based on socioeconomic roles and leaderships (Gilles et al., 2015),
the bank default and resolution (Klimek et al., 2015). More generally, Bargigli and Tedeschi
(2014) introduce some basic concepts and instruments in a wide range of economic network
models.
Pointing to the link between the banking system and real business economy, Delli Gatti et al.
(2010) model a more general credit network consisting of households, firms and banks, in view
to study the occurrence and likelihood of bankruptcy avalanches. Battiston et al. (2012), Ric-
cetti et al. (2013), Bargigli et al. (2014), and Catullo et al. (2015) extend this work. Lux (2016)
and Anand et al. (2013) develop stochastic models of the topology of bank-firm credit networks.
He et al. (2016) construct an endogenous credit network model that describes the formation of
firm-firm, firm-bank and bank-bank credit relationships. Moreover, Delli Gatti and Desiderio
(2015) and Beck et al. (2014) apply ABM to explore the effects of monetary policy. Their
simulations show its clear non-neutrality and transmission mechanism in the credit channel.
Valencia (2014) discuss a similar issue. Gabbi et al. (2015) focus on the linkage between the
inter- bank market and the real economy with a stylized central bank acting as a lender of
last resort. Our article contributes and expands on these analyses by paying specific attention
to the way banks perform credit creation along with inter-bank credit, clearing, and payment
settlement.
Concerning modeling the money creation process, Xiong et al. (2017) develop a multi-agent
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model describing the main mechanisms of money creation and money circulation in a credit
economy. Similarly, Chen et al. (2014) examine the money creation process in a random ex-
change model with debt among agents. Our article expands on these analyses by combining
payment and credit systems, while introducing endogenous money generation through bank
credit and interbank credit.
Our article contributes to this recent literature by taking a systemic perspective, aiming to
overcome received limited understanding of the systemic links between money, credit and bank-
ing. Some facts feature modern banking: monetary financial institutions (banks) issue claims
which function as money; they facilitate payments across agents in the economy over time and
space; they increase the money base through credit creation; they hold fractional reserves and
lend to each other (Blair, 2013; Ricks, 2016; Jakab and Kumhof, 2015). Our systemic per-
spective points to these featuring dimensions of ongoing bank activity within each bank entity
and across them. Each bank entity keeps currency money in bank deposits on behalf of other
agents. But the bank entity activity is further characterized by its capacity or privilege to use
these deposits, although the latter remain available for payment and redemption at will and
at par. Moreover, the bank can create a deposit by granting a loan to, or buy a security from
a borrower. This bank capacity or privilege involves money multiplication that enables bank
credit creation process over space and time. In this way, all the banks become interdependent
on the flow of payments that are performed across them, generating a ‘banking system’ (Biondi,
2017).
This banking dynamic system requires coordination within each bank and across them. Within
each bank entity, two featuring processes are at work: (i) An economic process that creates bank
money through credit, in view to generate income to the bank entity; and (ii) a financial process
that rebalances cash inflows and outflows when they become due through space and time. Since
each bank is structurally unbalanced due to money multiplication, interbank coordination is
required to maintain the banking system in operation over time and circumstances. Interbank
clearing, settlement and credit arrangements feature this interbank coordination which may oc-
cur under various institutional arrangements, such as central banking, central clearing parties,
and money markets. From this perspective, our conceptual framework embeds heterogeneous
agents into two collective dynamics: inter-agent interaction, and interaction between collective
structures and individual agents. These structures are consistent with the notion of ‘minimal
institution’ introduced by Shubik (2011) and Shubik and Smith (2016).
The rest of the article is organised as follows. Drawing upon this conceptual frame of reference,
we develop an interacting heterogeneous agents-based model of interbank credit coordination
under a set of minimal institutions (Section 2). First, we explore the theoretical link between in-
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terbank credit coordination and the money generation process (Section 3). Second, we develop
simulation comparative analysis on modes of interbank credit coordination, studying impact
of interbank dynamics on financial stability and resilience at individual and aggregate levels
(Section 4). Systemically destabilising forces prove to be related to the working of the banking
system over time, especially interbank coordination conditions and circumstances. A summary
of main findings and implications concludes (Section 5).
2 Agents-based dynamic modelling of the banking system
According to Xiong et al. (2017), the textbook story of money creation tells that the quan-
tity of loans commercial banks could possibly grant is constrained by the quantity of central
bank base money (central bank reserves, comprising currency and drawing facilities) and the
required reserve ratio. This story is consistent with fractional reserve lending of loanable funds,
where, period through period, each lending bank department is restricted to lend out only a
fraction of available cash in hand. Under fractional reserve requirement, money is therefore
created through a gradual, ad infinitum mechanical process of ‘lending out’ and ‘depositing in’
of cash in hand. This modelling strategy has been often criticised to neglect space and time of
money creation process, implying a reductionist view on its idiosyncratic, interactive, collective
and dynamic dimensions. In particular, this view makes banking system coordination virtually
irrelevant.
Our model extends and upgrades on this received understanding by drawing upon the func-
tional equivalence between currency and deposit. From this functional perspective, money can
be created both by issuing cash and cash-equivalent securities (that is, financial entitlements
that circulate and function like cash does), and by creating drawing facilities (bank deposits)
that promise to be redeemable in cash and cash-equivalents. In this context, banking, money
and credit are fundamentally linked one to another. When a bank lends to a borrowing client,
bank balance sheet simultaneously expands with the loan (an asset to the bank) and the deposit
(a liability to the bank), both relating to that customer, while the bank promises to make the
customer deposit redeemable in cash and cash equivalents (especially other banks’ deposits).
When the borrowing client repays its loan to the bank, the loan capital instalment reduces
the customer’s exposure (an asset reduction to the bank), while the bank does either acquire a
different kind of asset (if settlement is performed by cash transfer), or reduce its deposit liability
(if settlement is performed through customer’s deposit).
Our story replaces then fractional reserve lending with a money multiplication process. The
bank treasury department seeks to rebalance movements in cash and cash equivalents that
become due for settlement-related and credit-related payments, while the bank lending depart-
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ment levers upon cash and cash-equivalent holdings to create new loans. To disentangle the
systemic connection between payments, bank credit and inter-bank credit, we develop an agent-
based model comprising three functional steps that each bank passes through in managing its
relation with customers and with the other banks. These dynamic steps correspond to ongoing
dimensions of the banking system: (i) payments system (Section 2.2), (ii) bank credit creation
and destruction with customers (Section 2.3), and (ii) interbank settlement and credit system
(Section 2.4).
2.1 Setting the scene (INITIALISATION)
Our miniature financial system comprises the following agent types:
 A whole of customers cj , j = 1...C, which order payments over time periods t, while asking
for bank loans and repay them over time periods h >= t. For sake of simplicity, we may
assume that h = t without generality loss.
 A system of monetary financial institutions (banks) bi, i = 1...B, which perform payments on
behalf of other agents, and grant credits to customers and to each other.
 One Central Bank, which issues an exogenous quantity of currency A1 and acts as guarantor
of last resort if one bank remains exposed to other banks after interbank settlement and
credit.
Each bank balance sheet contains five kinds of assets and related liabilities (Table 1).
Table 1: Bank balance sheet items
Asset Liability
A1: Currency Reserves L1: Deposit (Base Money)
A2: Retail Loan L2: Deposit (Retail Loan)
A3: Interbank Lending L3: Interbank Borrowing
A4: Equity Reserve L4: Equity Provision
A5: Central Bank Assistance L5: Central Bank Guarantee
Bank asset side comprises:
• Currency Reserves (base money) held on behalf of customers, A1i,t
• Loan granted to, or securities underwritten from customers, A2i,t
• Loan granted to, or securities underwritten from other bank, A3i,t
• Equity Reserve, A4i,t
• Central Bank Assistance, A5i,t
Bank liability side comprises:
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• Currency Deposit by customers, L1i,t
• Loan Deposit by customers, L2i,t
• Interbank Loan Deposit by other banks, L3i,t
• Initial Equity Provision plus cumulated accrued profits and losses, L4i,t
• Central Bank contingent Guarantee, L5i,t
The initial allocation of base money between customers and banks is based on the following
steps:
Allocate every customer j to any one bank i randomly (l1i,j is j’s cash deposit in i):
{cj} −→ {Mcj→bi} −→ {bi} = l1i,j,t (1)
Allocate base money to all customers equally:
l1i,j,t=0 = A10/C (2)
Deposit all customers’ money to their own banks:
A1i,t=0 = L1i,t=0 =
∑
j∈mj,i=1
l1i,j,t=0, ∀mj,i ∈Mcj→bi (3)
Allocate total Equity Provision to banks equally:
A4i,t=0 = L4i,t=0 = A40/B (4)
Other balance sheet items
A2i,t=0 = L2i,t=0 = 0
A3i,t=0 = L3i,t=0 = 0
A5i,t=0 = L5i,t=0 = 0
(5)
Bank balance sheet identity:
A1i,t=0 +A2i,t=0 +A3i,t=0 = L1i,t=0 + L2i,t=0 + L3i,t=0
A4i,t=0 = L4i,t=0
A5i,t=0 = L5i,t=0
(6)
Based on the accounting equation 6 (balance sheet identity) of an individual bank i at initial
time period t = 0 (a time period t can be daily, weekly or monthly interval), we have the
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following balance at all time periods:
A1i,t +A2i,t +A3i,t = L1i,t + L2i,t + L3i,t
A4i,t = L4i,t
A5i,t = L5i,t
(7)
This miniature economy has a total base money A1 =
∑B
i A1i,t=0 =
∑B
i
∑C
j l1i,j,t=0 that is
distributed equally to C customers, and a total bank capital
∑B
i L4i,t=0 that is distributed
equally to B banks. Customers deposit all of their money to individual banks, based on a fixed
transition/selection matrix MC→B = (mcj→bi)C×B (where mcj→bi = 1 if bi is the bank of cj ,
else mcj→bi = 0). At time t = 0, the initial capital L4i,t=0 of bank i is provided, which also
adds to its initial equity reserve A4i,t=0 (the size of banks can be modeled equally or follow
some distributions in line with real industry data). The initial total deposit from customers
cj,j∈{C} to their bank bi,i∈{B} is L1i,t=0 =
∑
j l1i,j where deposited currency is issued by the
central monetary authority (assuming all customers’ money is stored in banks, no cash in hand
outside the banking system), adding to the initial base money cash reserve A1i,t=0 of bank i
(the initial money of customers can be modeled equally or follow some power law distributions
in line with real data). There is no initial loan to customers A2i,t=0 = 0 or L2i,t=0 = 0, no
interbank lending A3i,t=0 = 0 or borrowing L3i,t=0 = 0, no central bank assistance A5i,t=0 = 0
or guarantee L5i,t=0 = 0. Therefore, the initial individual bank balance sheet identity is:
A1i,t=0 = L1i,t=0
A4i,t=0 = L4i,t=0
(8)
where A1i,t=0 = L1i,t=0 =
∑
j l1i,j,t=0 and l1i,j,t is a customer j’s individual cash deposit in
his/her own bank i at time t.
Since our analysis focuses on financial stability implications of interbank coordination, we as-
sume that equity (A4/L4) and central bank (A5/L5) provisions are non-cash based, that is,
they do not modify reserve base holdings and obligations over time and circumstances. A fur-
ther extension may consider an additional set of minimal institutions to design and implement
equity payments and central banking monetary interventions.
Concerning bank equity capitalisation, for same of simplicity and in line with Delli Gatti et al.
(2010), we fix the number of banks and customers (i.e. exogenous) and we allocate equity capi-
tal equally across banks. Simulations start from identical initial conditions, but agents become
rapidly heterogeneous after interactions. In some circumstances, banks may experience losses
and then exhaust their initial equity provision. For sake of simplicity, we let survive banks with
negative equity, using total equity loss as an indicator of financial distress for the single bank
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and the financial system as a whole. On the contrary, Delli Gatti et al. (2010) replace defaulted
banks with new banks having small capital relative to the size of other solvent banks.
The model further disentangles ongoing banking activity through as sequence of three dynamic
modules: (1) Payments flow (money circulation among customers, where banks facilitate pay-
ments over space and time); (2) Lending to real economy (banks are loan creators through
long-term retail loans); (3) Interbank coordination (through both interbank credit and central
bank assistance as a residual balance item).
2.2 Model Module 1: Payments system
In our miniature economy, customers cj may use currency A1 to perform payments across them.
When this occurs, the bank of the customer cj which orders to pay does transfer customer cur-
rency reserve A1j,t while reducing customer currency deposit L1j,t. Conversely, the bank of
the customer which receives the payment does increase the customer currency deposit L1j,t
and customer currency reserve A1j,t. In this way, banks act as passive fiduciary depositors of
customers holdings of currency.
Moreover, due to functional equivalence between cash and bank deposit, customer cj may use
their bank deposit L2j,t to perform payments. Customer bank deposits are created when their
bank grants a loan A2j,h to them. When this bank deposit wire transfer occurs, the bank of
the customer x which orders to pay does reduce the customer bank deposit L1x,t by requested
payment amount. Conversely, the bank of the customer y which receives the payment does
increase the customer bank deposit L1y,t. However, by assumption, banks do not transfer cur-
rency reserves against bank deposit transfers. Instead, banks agree to grant interbank lending
and borrowing of same amount. The payer’s bank then borrows from the payee’s bank, adding
to its interbank liability L3x,t, while the payee’s bank lends to its paying counterparty, adding
to its interbank loan portfolio A3y,t. This mechanism reproduces the settlement mechanism
that is generally in place for banks through central bank facilities (Rule, 2015).
Initial exogenous quantity of central bank currency A10 was equally distributed across cus-
tomers and it now moves stochastically across them through time periods t. All cash holdings
A1 are held by financial institutions. Payments across customers settled in currency are gener-
ated through a random markov transition matrix across customer bank accounts.
Customers perform two kinds of payments in this module: (1) cash payments through cur-
rency transfers from the banks of paying customers to the banks of receiving customers (i.e.
updating both A1i,t and L1i,t in the banks’ balance sheet); (2) bank wire transfers that pay
through bank deposits L2i,t rather than transferring cash.
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2.2.1 Customers’ cash payment (A1/L1 update)
When modeling the first kind of payment (i.e. cash), a stochastic Markov transition matrix
M˜cx→cy is used to describe the transitions of cash payment among C customers. Each of its en-
tries m˜x→y represents the probability of a customer cx, x ∈ C to pay another customer cy, y ∈ C,
therefore 0 ≤ m˜x→y ≤ 1 and
∑
y m˜x→y = 1. (This means that the sum of each row in M˜cx→cy
is the total pay-out of a customer’s existing cash deposit, and the sum of each column is the
total pay-in from other customers that adds to a customer’s total new deposit.) A parameter
ξ1 ∈ [0, 1] controls the scale of customers’ cash payment. This implementation implicitly as-
sumes that customers are constrained by their cash deposit. Also, their net cash flow (a balance
between cash payable and receivable) is both small and balanced over time.
Hence, among the customers:
{cx} ξ1−→ {M˜cx→cy} −→ {cy} ⇒ ∆l1x→y,t (9)
In parallel, the bank of customer cx transfers an amount ∆l1x→y,t of A1 to the bank of customer
cy, and reduces the cash deposit of cx accordingly. In aggregate, every bank performs netting
between total cash-in and cash-out, updating both sides of their balance sheet as follows:
∆A1i,t = ∆L1i,t =
∑
y∈{m˜y→x>0}
∆l1y→x,t −
∑
x∈{m˜x→y>0}
∆l1x→y,t (10)
where cx is the customer of bank i and cy may be any customer of other banks.
2.2.2 Customers’ bank credit wire transfer (L2 and A3/L3 update)
When modeling the second kind of payment (i.e. bank loan deposit wire transfer), a similar
stochastic Markov transition matrix is used to describe the wire transfer payment transitions.
In this case, customers use their loan deposits l2i,j,t to perform their payments.
Therefore, among the customers:
{cx} −→ {M˜cx→cy} −→ {cy} ⇒ ∆l2x→y,t (11)
However, there are two differences when comparing to the cash payment movement: (1) Al-
though the payments are exchanged among customers, the actual net of credit transactions are
among banks. Therefore, a new transition matrix M˜bu→bv is used to model the interbank credit
net transition (i.e.: the net of total customer deposits in and out). (2) Since the customers can
borrow from their banks to pay other customers via bank credit, the customers are constrained
by the loan l2i,j,t granted by their own banks. A parameter ξ2 ∈ [0, 1] controls the scale of this
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transaction.
{bu} ξ2−→ {M˜bu→bv} −→ {bv} ⇒ ∆L2u→v,t (12)
where ∆L2u→v,t ≤ L2u,t for all banks. Each couple of banks perform clearing and settlement of
these wire payments in two steps. First, the two banks net mutual opposite positions against
each other. Second, they agree to transform the net residual difference in interbank lending and
borrowing.
Therefore, the netting transaction between any couple of two banks (u, v) is as follows:
∆L2u,v,t = ∆L2u→v,t −∆L2v→u,t, ∀(u, v), t (13)
where each bank coupled (u, v) deposit movement from bank to bank is the sum of customers
in one bank paying to customers in the other bank. For instance, for payments from bank u to
bank v: ∆L2u→v,t =
∑
cx∈bu,cy∈bv ∆l2x→y,t. In aggregate, every bank sums up all of these net
wire payments among other banks and update its L2i,t:
∆L2u,t =
∑
v∈{m˜u→v>0}
(
∆L2u→v,t −∆L2v→u,t
)
(14)
if ∆L2u,t > 0, then it increases the bank u’s L2, else if ∆L2u,t < 0, then it decreases the bank
u’s L2. In parallel, banks update their interbank credit (A3 and L3) among them:{
∆A3u,t = ∆L2u,t, if ∆L2u,t > 0
∆L3u,t = −∆L2u,t, if ∆L2u,t < 0.
(15)
These new amounts of interbank credit are recorded as a pair (u, v) between every two banks,
and add to the other A3 and L3 that will be created in the interbank network and repaid
together later on.
2.3 Model Module 2: Bank credit creation and destruction
While dealing with the payments system on behalf of its customers, each and every bank expe-
riences that an ongoing core of its reserve holdings A∗i,t ∈ (A1i,t, A2i,t, A3i,t) remains relatively
stable over time. Under the functional equivalence between currency and deposit, every bank
acquires the capacity or the privilege to use these holdings, while they remain available to the
agents that have borrowed from the bank, being them customers (L1j,t, L2j,t), or other banks
(L3j,t). This means that the bank holds an ongoing safety net on which its lending activity may
lever upon.
For sake of simplicity and without loss of generality, we assume that each bank lending de-
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partment does plan to lend to its customers only. Before seeking to grant new loans, each bank
receives loan repayments from customers which borrowed in the past.
2.3.1 Customers’ loan repayments (A2/L2 update)
In line with bank loan repayment mechanism introduced by Xiong et al. (2017), customers loan
repayment follows the following procedure. Generating a stochastic repayment ratio Ψ˜i,t for
each bank based on a Triangular Distribution (depending on the lower ψL, peak ψP and upper
ψU parameters):
Ψ˜i,t(ψL, ψP , ψU ) ∼ Triangular(ψL, ψP , ψU ) (16)
The loan is repaid based on the following repayment formula:
Repayment∆L2i,t = Ψ˜i,t · L2i,t (17)
This statistical distribution implies an average loan outstanding time of 3/(ψL +ψP +ψU ) and
a modal loan outstanding time of ψP . Since banks only lend to own customers, this mechanism
implies simple reverse lending as both A2i,t and L2i,t are reduced by Repayment∆L2i,t in the
bank balance sheet, where L2i,t is the existing loan portfolio of the bank. This mechanism
treats the real economy as a whole, without tracking individual customers and then individual
loans granted to them. In principle, each loan has its terms and conditions, including its own
duration and repayment profile. This involves that, at each period of time, each bank is con-
fronted with a portfolio of loans of different durations and repayment profiles. To capture this
feature without tracking each loan, we move from a universal repayment ratio for every bank
as in Xiong et al. (2017) to a stochastic one for each bank. Its statistical distribution denotes
the business cycle conditions in the real economy.
The model is calibrated to avoid customers default on their loans, implying that L2i,t ≥
∆L2i,t, ∀i, t (as in Equation 17 above). A further extension may consider an additional set
of minimal institutions to feature customer default resolution arrangements (Goodhart et al.,
2016).
2.3.2 Customer loan creation
After being repaid for previous loans, banks seek to grant new loans to their customers. The
model denotes two distinctive lending strategies, namely money multiplication and fractional
reserve lending.
Lending Behavior 1: Bank money multiplication lending mechanism
Based on the target reserve ratio γTRi,t and the existing “total reserve holding”
∑
A∗i,t, the
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maximum of total credit that each bank can grant is:
γTRi,t =
∑
A∗i,t
Maximum Lending
⇒ Maximum Lending =
∑
A∗i,t
γTRi,t
(18)
The existing total deposit is {L1 + L2 + L3}i,t, then each bank wishes to lend a multiple of
“total reserve base” to keep new and existing loans below the maximum level, so
∆A2i,t+1 ≤
∑
A∗i,t
γTRi,t
− {L1 + L2 + L3}i,t (19)
Therefore, the general formula of target lending under money multiplication is:
Potential∆A2i,t+1 = Max
{
0 ,
∑
A∗i,t
γTRi,t
− (L1i,t + L2i,t + L3i,t)
}
(20)
This formula implies that banks wish to maintain an ongoing safety net proportional to its
loan outstanding {L1 + L2 + L3}i,t. This restrictive condition may be relaxed by assuming
{L1 + L2}i,t, making interbank credit free from reserve corporate targeting or regulatory re-
quirement.
The target reserve parameter γTRi,t captures the bank treasury management policy which aims
to maintain an ongoing safety net between cash inflows and holdings, and cash outflows and
obligations. This target may include the minimum reserve ratio required by banking law and
regulation (γRR), the latter being a threshold that is universal across banks and may evolve
over time and circumstances.
Various definitions of reserve base
∑
A∗i,t involve featuring definitions of the ultimate means of
payment and settlement. When A1 only is retained, a narrow monetary system is defined that
restricts money functions to currency. When A1 and A3 are jointly retained, a broader mone-
tary system enables banks to settle interbank payments through mutual credit admittances over
time and circumstances. When A2 is introduced, a mechanism of loan securitisation is in place,
enabling banks to increase their liquidity (defined as held reserve base) through refinancing of
their asset holdings. In the rest of this article, we maintain a broad definition of reserve base
including A1 and A3 (broad monetary system).
The above equation compares with the textbook representation for fractional reserve lending of
loanable funds as follows:
Lending Behavior 2: Fractional reserve under loanable funds constraint
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Based on current values of the banks’ reserve base (
∑
A∗i,t) and total deposit {L1+L2+L3}i,t,
individual banks calculate their own target (required) reserves TRi,t (i.e.: the target/required
reserve to deal with potential deposit withdrawals):
TRi,t = γ
TR
i,t × (L1i,t + L2i,t + L3i,t) (21)
where γTRi,t is the target reserve ratio for bank i at time period t.
Each bank wishes to lend the share of total currently held reserve base to customers as new
retail loans (∆A2i,t+1) above the target reserve threshold:
∆A2i,t+1 =
∑
A∗i,t − TRi,t (22)
So the general formula of target lending is:
Potential∆A2i,t+1 = Max
{
0 ,
∑
A∗i,t − γTRi,t · (L1i,t + L2i,t + L3i,t)
}
(23)
In particular, the banking theory as pure intermediation of loanable funds imposes that only
A1 is included in the reserve base
∑
A∗i,t.
2.3.3 Bank credit realisation
Both lending strategies denote the ongoing bank potential offer of loans to customers at time
period h ≥ t. Banks potential offer of loans is then satisfied according to the following aggregate
absorption function by customers as a whole.
Hence, the actual granted loan:
Actual∆A2i,t+1 = Θ˜i,t · Potential∆A2i,t+1 (24)
where the proportion of potential lending Θ˜i,t is generated randomly from a triangular distri-
bution (dependent on the lower, peak, upper parameters):
Θ˜i,t(θL, θP , θU ) ∼ Triangular(θL, θP , θU ) (25)
This statistical distribution implies an average loan absorption of (ψL+ψP +ψU )/3 and a modal
loan absorption of ψP at each period. These parameters capture business cycle conditions in
the lending activity over time and circumstances. For sake of simplicity and without generality
loss, we treat customers as a whole, disregarding individual customer patterns of bank loan
granted, spent and repaid. A further extension may introduce a set of minimal institutions to
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design and implement real economy uses and fate of bank credit money.
Once each bank i gets its actual share of granted loans, it allocates them to its customers
j, increasing simultaneously both bank loan asset portfolio (A2j,h) and bank customer deposits
(L2j,h).
2.4 Model Module 3: Interbank settlement and credit system
Both payments settlement (module 1) over time periods t, and bank credit creation and de-
struction (module 2) over time periods h reshape bank outstanding asset holdings and liability
obligations throughout time and space. This ongoing dynamic requires the bank treasury de-
partment to manage the bank financial process to rebalance cash (and cash equivalents) outflows
and inflows, seeking to maintain ongoing bank capacity to settle obligations when they become
due in time and amount. As for banks hold reserves to settle payments and meet reserve re-
quirements (Fullwiler, 2008). This ongoing rebalancing activity is performed through interbank
borrowing and lending. When a bank lends to another bank, bank balance sheet simultaneously
expands with the loan (an asset to the bank) and the deposit (a liability to the bank), both
in the name of the other bank, while the bank promises to make the borrowing bank deposit
redeemable in cash or cash equivalents (that is, whatever asset A∗ is included in reserve base
definition
∑
A∗).
2.4.1 Interbank credit repayment system
Before seeking for new interbank lending and borrowing, all the banks repay their outstanding
loans L3 that have become due in period t according to the following steps:
Step 1: Each bank records its outstanding interbank lending and borrowing over time, so every
loan has one-to-one match between a lender and a borrower at a particular time t;
Step 2: At each time period, some randomly selected loans come to be repaid (selected from all
outstanding loans through all historical periods), depending on the interbank repayment
likelihood parameter ωi,t;
Step 3: The control parameter ωi,t for each bank i at time period t manages the likelihood of
repayment and may vary over time and circumstances;
Step 4: The repayment is settled by the repaying bank through a proportional transfer of its
reserve base components A∗: for the lender, it decreases its interbank lending item A3
and increases its reserve base A∗; for the borrower, it decreases its interbank borrowing
item L3 and decreases its reserve bases A∗;
Step 5: After interbank loan repayment, each bank updates its record of outstanding interbank
lending and borrowing.
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This simple repayment mechanism is sufficient to denote interbank lending dynamics. A further
extension of the model may transform this mechanism in a more sophisticated treasury man-
agement function by each bank, and more sophisticated institutional arrangements to frame
this management over time and circumstances.
The model implements interbank repayment as follows.
A 3-dimension matrix MB×B×T records all outstanding interbank loans (created through cus-
tomers’ bank credit wire transfer and credit coordination in interbank networking). A remaining
loan is recorded as mu→v,t > 0, ∀m ∈ MB×B×T , otherwise if mu→v,t = 0 loan is absent). At
each time, another random 3-dimension matrix D˜B×B×T is generated where each element d˜u,v,t
is drawn from a uniform distribution ∼ U(0, 1).
The repayment triggering threshold in the repayment decision matrix D˜B×B×T is fixed as fol-
lows,
d˜u,v,t > ωu,t, ∀(u, v) ∈ {mu→v,t > 0} (26)
(where ωu,t parameter controls for interbank repayment probability, i.e. a higher ωu,t means
that interbank loans are repaid more slowly implying a longer duration on average, and (u, v)
identifies a pair of lender-borrower.)
When the repayment is triggered, bank u repays interbank loan mu→v,t where d˜u,v,t > ωu,t,
therefore mu→v,t becomes zero, and the repayment is paid back to the previous lending bank v
and adds to its reserve base
∑
A∗i,t in proportion to reserve base components. Borrower reserve
accounts A∗ decrease and may become zero for A1 and negative for other A∗ because of this
repayment. Indeed the repaying bank may seek to recover from this exposure through further
inter-bank borrowing.
The balance sheet items (A3/L3/A*) are updated as follows:
• Once a pair of lender-borrower (u, v) is selected to repay the remaining loan mu→v,τ , the
lender u’s A3u,t and the borrower v’s L3v,t at the current period are reduced by each
mu→v,τ ,∀τ ∈ {1...t}.
• Each pair (u, v, τ) also identifies the weights of different reserve base component at time τ
as A∗i,τ /
∑
A∗i,τ , so the lender u’s each reserve base component A∗u,t is increased, while
the borrower v’s each reserve base component A∗v,t is reduced in proportion to reserve
components at current or past period levels.
• This process is repeated for all selected remaining loans mu,v,τ ,∀u, v, τ .
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After interbank repayment settlements, banks with outstanding excess reserve holdings may
seek to lend, while banks with outstanding reserve needs do seek to borrow. In this context, a
minimal reserve requirement implies a balance threshold higher than zero to distinguish between
potential bank lenders and borrowers.
2.4.2 Interbank credit pooling system
This section introduces the dynamic interactions of interbank credit coordination. Both the
completeness and perfection of this pooling system is managed by a credit control parameter
φ ∈ [0, 1]. In particular, with φ = 0 the system works under complete and perfect pooling,
while with φ = 1 the system does not experience any interbank credit. A system is complete
when all banks can potentially become borrowers and lenders. A system is perfect when all
banks do actually become either borrowers or lenders. In section 4, simulation analysis will
comparatively assess the system working against different levels of incomplete and imperfect
coordination modes, inferring systemic implications of interbank coordination for financial sta-
bility and resilience. The inter-bank coordination quality parameter φi,t may be settled at
different values across banks i and time periods t. For sake of simplicity, our simulation analy-
sis denotes it through one universal value for all i, t.
Interbank credit coordination mechanism is implemented as follows:
Calculating reserve situation: Based on its individual bank target reserve ratio γTRi,t and its
own current reserve base level (
∑
A∗i,t), each bank identifies its reserve surplus (denoting
a potential lender) or shortage (denoting a potential borrower).
The current reserve ratio of a bank i (all balance sheet items being updated up to this
step) is:
γCRi,t =
∑
A∗i,t
L1i,t + L2i,t + L3i,t
(27)
The bank’s excess reserve (surplus) when γCRi,t > γ
TR
i,t is:
ERi,t = (γ
CR
i,t − γTRi,t ) · (L1i,t + L2i,t + L3i,t) (28)
The bank’s reserve need (shortage) when γCRi,t < γ
TR
i,t is:
RNi,t = (γ
TR
i,t − γCRi,t ) · (L1i,t + L2i,t + L3i,t) (29)
Calculating weights of reserve bases: since the balance sheet comprises different reserve
base components A∗i,t ∈ (A1i,t, A2i,t, A3i,t) which may be used for interbank settlement
proportionally to their relative weight in
∑
A∗i,t, we compute and record the share of each
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reserve base component in the total reserve for each bank. When issuing or repaying the
interbank loan, the reserve base components will be updated according to these weight:
WeightA∗i,t =
A∗i,t∑
A∗i,t (30)
Generating a potential lender-borrower matrix: All banks are now separated into two
groups (i.e. lenders and borrowers). The system forms a matrix MB×B (B is the total
number of banks in the system), lending banks being marked as 1 into the rows, and
those borrowing banks being marked as 1 into the columns. When a lending bank finds
a borrowing bank, their cells in the matrix have both column and row as 1. Hence, this
matrix defines all combinations of potential lenders and borrowers. When a lending bank
l matches a borrowing bank b, then the element ml→b = 1,m ∈ MB×B, defining a pair
(l, b). A bank with excess reserve is a potential lender for all borrowers (who need reserve),
and vice-versa. Therefore,
ml→b = 1, ∀l ∈ B{γCRi,t > γTRi,t } ∩ ∀b ∈ B{γCRi,t < γTRi,t } (31)
Generating an actual lender-borrower matrix: Another B × B matrix is used to define
the actual pair of lender-borrower. The system creates a random probability selection
matrix M˜probB×B, whose element m˜
p
l,b is generated by one of the following approaches: “en-
dogenous partner search” or “exogenous random matching” (Delli Gatti et al., 2010).
“Endogenous partner search”: A preferential attachment parameter is generated for each
pair (l, b) according to the lending bank gearing ratio and the borrowing bank relative
exposure to interbank credit as follows:
rl→b,t = α(Ll,t)−α + α(lb,t)α, with α > 0 (32)
where Ll,t = max{0;L4l,t/(L1l,t+L2l,t+L3l,t+L5l,t)} (i.e. equity ratio over total liability
of bank l) and lb,t = L3b,t/(L1b,t + L2b,t + L3b,t + L5b,t) (i.e. interbank borrowing ratio
over total liability of bank b) at time t. Then, we can follow the partner selection criterion
by Delli Gatti et al. (2010) as follows:
m˜pl,b = λe
−λ·rl→b,t , ∀(l, b) ∈ {ml→b = 1} with λ > 0 (33)
Comparing with Delli Gatti et al. (2010), our model has a few differences: (1) our model
extends the loan repayment duration to multiple periods (via a stochastic loan repayment
ratio ωi,t); (2) our model extends to multi-lenders with multi-borrowers where each lender
has a limited funding; (3) they analyze the impact of lending (revenue: interest, or loss:
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bad debt) to bank profit and loss statement, while we focus on the impact of loan trans-
actions on bank balance sheet dynamics.
“Exogenous random matching”: This approach draws the actual matching matrix ele-
ments from uniform distribution as follows:
m˜pl,b ∼ U(0, 1) (34)
The rest of the procedure is identical for both approaches. Once we have all probabilities
for all potential pairs of lender-borrower (l, b), we select those pairs whose probabilities
are larger than a threshold to form actual subsets of interbank networks:
m˜pl,b > φt, with φt ∈ [0, 1] (35)
We control this threshold parameter in order to manage the degree of imperfect pooling
(i.e.: if φt = 0, then the network realises perfect pooling). This implementation helps
to select multi-lenders with limited funding, contrary to Delli Gatti et al. (2010) which
introduce only one lender with unlimited funding available.
Allocating reserve within subsets of interbank network: The actual selection matrix may
contain either borrowers (lenders) who couldn’t find lenders (borrowers), or borrowers
(lenders) who have one or more lenders (borrowers). Each borrower decides to borrow
in proportion to its reserve shortage from the group of its actual lenders based on those
lenders’ total excess reserve. Borrowers request the needed amount of reserve from their
actual lenders. Each lender forms a subgroup between itself and its actual borrowers.
This means that borrowers and lenders form subsets of interbank credit networks where
banks coordinate their reserve need and excess for the period t being. Since interbank
loans may last for some periods, this makes interbank credit networks evolving over time
and circumstances captured by the parameter space.
Updating bank balance sheet items: If a pair of lender-borrower (l, b) performs interbank
credit for an amount ∆A3l→b,t = ∆L3l→b,t, then the lender’s A3l,t and borrower’s L3b,t
are increased by this amount. This operation is repeated for each coupled transaction.
Borrowers and lenders constitute interbank pooling networks.
Recording interbank loans in the repayment matrix: Actual new interbank loan trans-
actions at this period t between lenders and borrowers are recorded in the 3-Dimension
matrix MB×B×T , together with all the other outstanding interbank credits and debts. If
the interbank loan need is not fully satisfied within a subgroup, the borrowers ask the
central bank for overdraft assistance.
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2.5 Central bank as guarantor of last resort
In some circumstances, the model dynamic makes possible that, after interbank credit coordi-
nation, one bank remains exposed, that is, it is still unable to match its reserve base targets
and obligations in that time period t.
In this situation, the model introduces a non-cash central bank facility that acts as a resid-
ual guarantee, enabling the exposed bank to roll over its overdraft obligations until the next
period t + 1. For sake of simplicity, this facility is non-cash based, that is, it does not enter
the reserve base dotation of the exposed bank, which must pay a punitive guarantee fee on
this contingent liability A5i,t outstanding. This modeling strategy is consistent with overdraft
facilities provided by major central banks (Fullwiler, 2008). This simplification helps focusing
the model dynamic on the impact of interbank credit that is under examination in this article.
Central bank exposure may be considered as a signal for financial instability and fragility gen-
erated by both bank excess behaviours and interbank lacks of coordination. A further extension
of the model may include a set of minimal institutions to design and implement central bank
monetary interventions and monetary financial institution defaults.
If a bank remains in reserve shortage after interbank credit coordination, that is,
∑
A∗ is
less than target reserve TRi,t, the central bank provides a guarantee L5i,t to complete the level
of reserves with:
A5i,t = L5i,t
Therefore: ∑
A∗i,t +A5i,t = TRi,t (36)
The assisted bank pays an overdraft guarantee fee on the central bank assistance, as follows:
pii,t = pii,t−1 − rL5i,t · L5i,t (37)
where rL5i,t is equal to the interbank rate r
L3
i,t plus punitive spread.
This assistance from the central bank is fully removed at the beginning of the next period
t+ 1 as follows:
∆A5i,t+1 = ∆L5i,t+1 = −L5i,t (38)
2.6 Bank Equity dynamics
Bank equity was initialized by non-cash provision equally distributed across banks. We further
model equity dynamics period through period. Following Xu et al. (2016), fee and interest rates
of reference fluctuate according to exogenous stochastic distributions. A further extension of
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the model may include a set of minimal institutions to design and implement interdependency
between these rates and underlying banking and financial conditions and circumstances.
Once bank balance sheets have been updated by all the four steps (payments settlement; bank
credit creation and destruction; interbank settlement and credit; central bank guarantee), each
bank accrues non-cash movements to its income statement as follows:
 Concerning bank lending department with customers:
• Borrowing interest rates pay to customers over outstanding currency deposit L1
• Management fees as expense to customers over held currency deposits A1
• Borrowing interest rates pay to customers over outstanding currency deposit L2
• Lending interest charges as revenues from customers over outstanding loans A2
 Concerning interbank lending and borrowing:
• Interbank lending interest charges as revenues from borrowing banks over outstanding
interbank credits A3. Conversely, the same amounts become expenses for borrowing
banks.
• Interbank borrowing interest charges as expenses to lending banks over outstanding
loans L3. Conversely, the same amounts become revenues for lending banks.
 Guarantee fees as expenses incurred by the guaranteed bank over temporary central bank
assistance L5
Bank equity is updated as follows:
L4i,t = A4i,t = L4i,t−1 + pii,t (39)
where profit pii,t is the sum of all these movements:
pii,t = (r
A1
i,t A1i,t + r
A2
i,t A2i,t + r
A3
i,t A3i,t)− (rL1i,t L1i,t + rL2i,t L2i,t + rL3i,t L3i,t + rL5i,t L5i,t) (40)
where rA3i,t and r
L3
i,t are equal for each couple between lender and borrower.
As bank balance sheet amounts evolve according to their own movements over time and cir-
cumstances, this equity dynamic enables the model to capture the ongoing impact of various
bank activities on bank profits and losses. For sake of simplicity, this dynamics is non-cash
based, that is, it does not enter the reserve base dotation of the bank period through period
and it is not distributed to management and shareholders. This simplification helps focusing
the model dynamic on the impact of interbank credit that is under examination in this article.
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Bank Equity dynamic may be considered as a signal for financial resilience, showing the ongoing
capacity of each bank and the banking system as a whole to face possible credit losses. A further
extension of the model may include a set of minimal institutions to design and implement cash
equity transactions, including transactions with shareholders and bank default resolutions.
The Table 2 summarizes key parameters, and their benchmark values and features.
Table 2: Summary of parameters and values in the model
Parameter Description Benchmark Variation Baseline Calibration (Section 4)
T Total time periods Fixed 50
B Total number of banks Fixed 10
C Total number of customers Fixed 1000
A10 Total base money 1× 109 Fixed 1× 109
A40 Total capital of all banks 1× 108 Fixed 1× 108
rA1i,t Interest rate of asset A1 0.01 [0.005, 0.015] ∼ Triangular(0.005, 0.01, 0.015)
rA2i,t Interest rate of asset A2 0.03 [0.02, 0.04] ∼ Triangular(0.02, 0.03, 0.04)
rA3i,t Interest rate of asset A3 0.015 [0.005, 0.025] ∼ Triangular(0.005, 0.015, 0.025)
rL1i,t Interest rate of liability L1 0.01 [0.005, 0.015] ∼ Triangular(0.005, 0.01, 0.015)
rL2i,t Interest rate of liability L2 0.01 [0.005, 0.015] ∼ Triangular(0.005, 0.01, 0.015)
rL3i,t Interest rate of liability L3 0.015 [0.005, 0.025] ∼ Triangular(0.005, 0.015, 0.025)
rL5i,t Interest rate of liability L5 r
L3
i,t + 0.03 [0.035, 0.055] r
L3
i,t + 0.03
γRR Bank required reserve ratio 0.1 Fixed 0.1
γTRi,t Bank target reserve ratio γ
RR + z˜ Stochastic γRR
α Partner selection not used Fixed n/a in “Exogenous matching”
λ Partner selection not used Fixed n/a in “Exogenous matching”
φi,t Interbank credit pooling quality 0 [0,1] 0/0.4/0.8
θL, θP , θU Actual customer loan creation (0,0.5,1) [0,1] ∼ Triangular(0, 0.8, 1)
ψL, ψP , ψU Customer loan repayment (0,0.5,1) [0,1] ∼ Triangular(0, 0.3, 1)
ωi,t Interbank loan repayment (0,0.5,1) [0,1] 0.5
ξ1 Scale of customers’ cash payment 0.1 [0,1] 0.1
ξ2 Scale of bank credit wire transfer 0.1 [0,1] 0.1
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3 Interbank credit and the money generation process
Our model features the connection between money as a means of payment and bank credit gen-
eration. In particular, banks define their lending strategy in relation to their ongoing capacity
to face payment settlement obligations over time and circumstances. This implies that banks
watch over ongoing inflows and outflows of means of payment (cash and cash equivalents) in
order to target their ongoing potential capacity to offer loans period through period. In this
context, bank reserve holdings are defined through whatever bank assets A∗ that may be used
to settle payments with other banks. These assets jointly define the reserve base that the bank
takes into account to decide its lending capacity through leverage, enabling its contribution to
the money multiplication process. Schumpeter (1954, pp. 320) masterly denotes this process
as money manufacturing. In this context, “banks are no longer said to ‘lend their deposits’
or ‘other people’s money,’ but to ‘create’ deposits or bank notes: they appear to manufacture
money rather than to increase its velocity or to act, which is a completely unrealistic idea, on
behalf of their depositors.”
According to textbook story of money creation under fractional reserves and available loan-
able funds, interbank credit is relegated to the backyard of the banking system. It may be
considered as a minor mechanism that enables banks to temporarily postpone payments in or-
der to facilitate settlement and clearing across banks, with no impact on the overall working
of the banking system. Our model is capable to reproduce this narrow monetary system as a
cornerstone case which occurs when the reserve base is narrowly defined as currency only, that
is, A1. This case may be reproduced under both lending mechanisms (Equation 23 and 20)
which feature fractional reserve and money multiplication processes. Figure 1 illustrates this
result.
However, the functional equivalence between currency and deposit introduces an additional
source of money creation into the financial system. This source comes from the working bank-
ing system which, through interbank credit, makes itself potentially independent from base
money issued by central banking. Heuristically, this may happen not only when central bank-
ing expands its reserve base definition to admit bank securities and bank credit admittances
(A3i,t) to its refinancing facilities, but also when banks keep renewing drawing facilities to each
other (L3i,t), or keep issuing credit admittances (A3i,t) that circulate as cash equivalents for
settling interbank payments over time. Figure 2 illustrates this scenario.
Under ideal conditions similar to textbook case (Figure 2 case: left diagram), broad interbank
credit mechanism involves two featuring results that contrast with received textbook story. Ac-
cording to the latter, interbank credit does not matter and the aggregate money creation is
bound by the outstanding reserve base issued by the central bank (high powered money). In
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contrast, on the one hand, a banking system embedded into a broad monetary system generates
an additional money aggregate made of interbank credit money which complements both bank
credit money and currency money aggregates. On the other hand, it makes the potential offer
of bank credit potentially unbound (Figure 2 cases: middle and right diagrams).
Together, these featuring results pave the way to a better understanding of systemic implica-
tions of interbank credit for financial stability and resilience. As for interbank credit generates
additional aggregate money while increasing bank leverage and exposure. It further expands
bank credit capacity potentially without limits or, better, within evolving limits endogenously
imposed by real economy absorption and institutional arrangements. The next section applies
this model to assess the impact on financial stability and resilience of this broad banking system
under conditions of incomplete and imperfect interbank credit pooling.
Figure 1: Aggregate analysis of narrow banking: both visualizations are generated based on the benchmark values
in Table 2, when the interbank coordination is in perfect pooling, all banks use A1 as the reserve base (i.e. narrow
banking), no repayment of customer loans, the interbank loans are repaid randomly and on average repaid fully
in two time periods. The only difference is: the left diagram shows the simulation result when all banks’ lending
strategy is based on the conventional rule of fractional reserve, while the right diagram illustrates the money
multiplication lending strategy.
4 Financial stability and interbank credit coordination modes
Section 2 introduced our model of bank credit creation featured by interbank credit under the
functional equivalence between currency and deposit. Section 3 illustrated the working of the
banking system in case of perfect and complete interbank credit pooling across all the monetary
financial institutions (banks).
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Figure 2: Aggregate analysis of broad banking: all three visualizations are generated based on the benchmark
values in Table 2, when the interbank coordination is in perfect pooling, no repayment of customer loans, but also
no repayment of interbank loans. However, the left diagram represents the simulation result when all banks use
A1 as the reserve base (i.e. narrow banking), while banks in both the middle and right diagrams use A1 +A3 as
reserve base (i.e. broad banking). Another difference is: banks in both the left and middle diagrams use the lending
strategy of fractional reserve, while the right diagram is based on the lending strategy of money multiplication.
Complete and perfect pooling provides a benchmark representation against which we may com-
paratively assess the impact of interbank credit coordination on financial stability and resilience.
This ideal coordination mode enables all the banks to access to all the others at each period
(complete pooling network), with all banks being interested in either lending to, or borrowing
from each other (perfect pooling network). Therefore, the reserve base that is factually segre-
gated across banks is completely and perfectly pooled among them, in view to assure interbank
settlement and credit at each time period t.
This section 4 develops some visualizations through simulation analysis to compare results
under this ideal coordination mode with two alternative modes of incomplete and imperfect
pooling. One mode is featured by a smooth degree of inter-bank coordination (with φ = 0.4).
Another mode is featured by a distressed degree of inter-bank coordination (with φ = 0.8).
When inter-bank credit conditions worsen, it becomes increasingly difficult for potential bor-
rowing banks to find counter-parties willing to lend (captured by decreasing levels of inter-bank
coordination quality parameter φ). This comparative analysis may help inferring implications
of banking system dynamic for financial stability and resilience.
The following simulation analysis applies a baseline calibration that is common to each sce-
nario (Table 2). This calibration sets the same economic and financial conditions through all
time periods and all visualizations. Customer and interbank credit repayments are now acti-
vated which dynamically offset the ongoing credit creation toward customers and other banks.
By assumption, interbank credit is repaid quicker than customer credit. For sake of simplicity,
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no default occurs on either credit facility. Our simulation analysis focuses on systemic out-
comes under featured conditions of interbank coordination. In particular, we visualize results
for four systemic outcomes under three levels of interbank credit coordination quality (labeled
respectively perfect, smooth, and distressed pooling). The four systemic outcomes point to: (i)
customer lending; (ii) interbank credit (lending and borrowing); (iii) central bank recourse; and
(iv) bank equity and profit and loss at each period. The following preliminary results may be
further developed and corroborated − including through replication, robustness and sensitivity
− to study interbank credit impact on financial stability and resilience for each bank and the
banking system as a whole.
For sake of comparison with visualizations in section 3 (Figures 1 and 2), the money aggre-
gate dynamics under baseline calibration is reproduced in Figure 3. A single bank illustrative
case (Figure 3 panel 2) shows that banks follow their own heterogeneous time patterns for each
money aggregate {L1i,t;L2i,t;L3i,t}, which sums up to generate a banking system with moder-
ate customer loan growth over time (Figure 3 panel 1).
Concerning customer lending (Figure 4), better interbank credit coordination (perfect and
smooth pooling scenarios) involves higher aggregate lending to customers. Moreover, some
individual banks can also maintain larger customer loan portfolios over time in this circum-
stance. This result is qualified by the quite heroic assumption that real economy customers do
keep absorbing bank loan offers over time without limit or default. It shall be further tested by
replication and sensitivity analysis over the parameter space.
Increased customer lending does further involve an increased interdependency on the flow of
payments that are performed through bank wire transfer movements across customer bank de-
posits L2i,t. Concerning interbank lending (Figure 5) and borrowing (Figure 6), individual
interbank credit behaves as expected to worsening interbank coordination quality (decreasing
level of φ). Worsened conditions reduce interbank lending both in aggregate (Figure 5 panel
1) and at the level of individual banks (Figure 5 panel 2). Therefore, borrowing banks are
restrained in their access to interbank credit (Figure 6), both in aggregate (Figure 6 panel 1)
and for individual amounts (Figure 6 panel 2).
Although better interbank credit conditions involve larger and more intense exposure to inter-
bank borrowing (Figure 6), this does not generate increased recourse to central bank assistance
(Figure 7). Deterioration in interbank coordination (smooth and distressed pooling scenarios)
generates fragilities in individual and collective bank exposures. As long as interbank coordi-
nation works perfectly (perfect pooling scenario), aggregate and individual recourses to central
bank assistance are immaterial and then virtually non-existent (Figure 7, perfect pooling sce-
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nario). When interbank conditions worsen, banks are increasingly forced to have recourse to
central bank overdraft facility to keep their affairs ongoing. Their recourse becomes more in-
tense in amount and more frequent in time, involving longer and more acute state of distress
for individual banks and then the banking system as a whole. As expected, distressed pooling
scenario makes the central bank recourse L5i,t the most frequent in time and the most intense in
both aggregate and individual amounts. Moreover, the banking system needs assistance almost
permanently under distressed pooling, while assistance requests occur later and sporadically
under smooth pooling.
Previous analysis shows that interbank credit coordination has impact on customer loan, inter-
bank borrowing and recourse to central bank assistance. Consequently, it shapes bank equity
dynamics over time and circumstances (Figure 8). Under lower interbank coordination quality
(smooth and distressed pooling scenarios), bank equity (L4i,t) remains thinner on average and
more concentrated on lower amounts (Figure 8 panel 1). Bank profits and losses (P/L) of the
period pii,t (i.e. ∆L4i,t) are also materially lower, due to less revenue from customer loans and
increased expense for central bank assistance. Therefore, under lower interbank coordination
quality (smooth and distressed pooling scenarios), banks are increasingly unable to accumulate
equity reserves through retained earnings, in view to protect themselves against possible losses
incurred in ongoing customer and interbank lending. In fact, this result is qualified by the quite
heroic assumption that banks do not distribute dividends to management and shareholders.
It may yet hold when this distribution remains in line with realized earnings over time and
circumstances.
5 Conclusive remarks
Troubles in interbank credit coordination may trigger systemic crises. This happened when,
since summer 2007, interbank credit did not longer work smoothly across financial institutions,
leading to central bank interventions and government bailouts to protect financial stability and
assure financial resilience. While this crisis was accidentally triggered by rising actual and ex-
pected defaults in some bank asset categories, the origins of the global financial meltdown were
found in systemic fragilities related to bank excess behaviours and the overarching dynamics of
interbank credit.
Our article develops an interacting heterogeneous agents-based model of interbank credit coor-
dination under minimal institutions, taking a systemic perspective on the relationship between
bank credit, money creation and interbank credit. Specific attention is paid to the way banks
perform credit creation along with interbank credit, clearing, and payment settlements.
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Figure 3: Money aggregate dynamics under baseline calibration (parameter values are summarized in the Ta-
ble 2). Three degrees of inter-bank coordination are analyzed (i.e. perfect pooling φ = 0, smooth pooling φ = 0.4,
and distressed pooling φ = 0.8). Panel 1 shows the total amounts of money aggregates in the systems of three
analyzed cases, and Panel 2 provides a single bank illustrative case.
Figure 4: Customer lending under baseline calibration (parameter values are summarized in the Table 2). Three
degrees of inter-bank coordination are analyzed (i.e. perfect pooling φ = 0, smooth pooling φ = 0.4, and distressed
pooling φ = 0.8). Panel 1 shows the total accumulated amounts of customer loans in the systems of three analyzed
cases over time, and Panel 2 provides the histograms of all individual banks’ customer loans.
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Figure 5: Interbank lending under baseline calibration (parameter values are summarized in the Table 2). Three
degrees of inter-bank coordination are analyzed (i.e. perfect pooling φ = 0, smooth pooling φ = 0.4, and distressed
pooling φ = 0.8). Panel 1 shows the total accumulated amounts of interbank lending in the system of three
analyzed cases over time, and Panel 2 provides the histograms of all individual banks’ interbank lending.
Figure 6: Interbank borrowing under baseline calibration (parameter values are summarized in the Table 2).
Three degrees of inter-bank coordination are analyzed (i.e. perfect pooling φ = 0, smooth pooling φ = 0.4, and
distressed pooling φ = 0.8). Panel 1 shows the total accumulated amounts of interbank borrowing in the system of
three analyzed cases over time, and Panel 2 provides the histograms of all individual banks’ interbank borrowing.
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Figure 7: Central bank assistance under baseline calibration (parameter values are summarized in the Table 2).
Three degrees of inter-bank coordination are analyzed (i.e. perfect pooling φ = 0, smooth pooling φ = 0.4, and
distressed pooling φ = 0.8). Panel 1 shows the amounts of central bank assistance in the system of three analyzed
cases over time, and Panel 2 provides the histograms of all individual central bank assistance.
Figure 8: Bank equity dynamics over time and circumstances under baseline calibration (parameter values are
summarized in the Table 2). Three degrees of inter-bank coordination are analyzed (i.e. perfect pooling φ = 0,
smooth pooling φ = 0.4, and distressed pooling φ = 0.8). Panel 1 shows the histograms of bank equity (L4i,t) over
time in the system of three analyzed cases (Equation 39), and Panel 2 provides the histograms of all individual
banks’ profit or loss (pii,t) in each time period (Equation 40).
30
First, our analysis explores the relationship between interbank credit coordination and aggre-
gate money generation process. Contrary to received understanding, interbank credit has the
capacity to make the monetary system unbound in some configurations. Second, a simulation
analysis studies modes of interbank credit coordination, addressing interbank dynamics impact
on financial stability and resilience at individual and aggregate levels. Systemically destabilizing
forces prove to be related to the working of the banking system over time, especially interbank
coordination conditions and circumstances.
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Appendices
A Summary of other notations
• bi: a bank i = 1...B, where B denotes the set of all banks in the system
• cj : a customer j = 1...C, where C denotes the set of all customers
• Mcj→bi : a fixed matrix that identifies a customer j’s bank i
• mj→i: each element in Mcj→bi , if j’s bank is i, then mj,i = 1, otherwise 0
• M˜cx→cy : a stochastic matrix that models a customer x pay customer y
• m˜x→y: each element in M˜cx→cy that states a percentage of customer x’s deposit pay to y
• M˜bu→bv : a stochastic matrix that models a bank u pay v
• m˜u→v: each element in M˜bu→bv that states an amount bank u pay bank v
• li,j,t: a customer j’s deposit in its bank i at time t (e.g. l1i,j,t is cash deposit)
• pii,t: a bank i’s profit and loss at time t
• ∆: an incremental change
• Ψ˜i,t: a stochastic customer loan repayment ratio
• Θ˜i,t: a stochastic proportion of potential target loan that is actually granted
• Triangular(Lower, Peak, Upper): a triangular distribution with parameters
• MB×B×T : A 3-dimension matrix records all remaining interbank loans
• mu→v,t: each element in MB×B×T that records a remaining interbank loan from bank u
to bank v at time t
• γCRi,t : a bank’s current reserve ratio
• ERi,t: a bank’s excess reserve
• RNi,t: a bank’s reserve needs
• TRi,t: a bank’s target reserve
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